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The political approach to foreign trade has a long history in the United
States, especially in our dealings with communist countries. For example,
the emergence of the Soviet regime in Russia after the 1917 Revolution was
greeted in this country with misgivings and a concomitant refusal to recognize
the new government. That recognition and the settlement of outstanding
economic and political questions between the U.S. and Russia came only
after the rise of Hitlerism upset the balance of power in Europe. Similarly,
the Soviet-Nazi Alliance of August, 1939 affected American relations with
Russia, as did the German attack on the Soviet Union in 1941. This article
examines the development of the legal basis for foreign trade with Communist
China and suggests alternative structures for future economic relations.
I
TRADE RESTRICTIONS IMPOSED ON COMMUNIST COUNTRIES IN GENERAL
A. Legislation
In the post World War II period, the Soviet Union became the center of
a system of states with communist governments which extended from Central
Europe to Asia. The expansion of communism over this vast area led to the
Cold War in which trade restrictions became an important instrument of policy.
One important component of those restrictions, the Trading With the Enemy
Act of 1917,' antedates the Cold War, but provided a workable basis for con-
trolling economic cooperation with the communist countries. Similarly, the
Johnson Debt Default Act, enacted in 1934, which originally prohibited cer-
tain financial transactions by private persons involving foreign governments
which were in default of their obligations to the United States,2 was later used
as an instrument for restricting trade with the socialist countries. The most
important piece of legislation specially designed to impose controls on trade
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the People's Republic of China: A Market Decontrolled, 13 VA. J. INT'L L. 78 (1973). See also Reghizzi,
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veloping Trade With China, 13 VA. J. INTL L.J. 13 (1973).
2 18 U.S.C. § 955 (1970). While its main effect was on the terms of credit, which at one time were
quite general and absolute, as time went by the terms of the Johnson Act became quite diluted.
See Starr, Trading With the U.S.S.R. and China, 28 Bus. LAW. 1301, 1303-04 (1973).
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with communist nations was the Export Control Act of 1949, 3 which was
replaced twenty years later by the Export Administration Act of 1969. 4
Virtually all of this legislation provided for regulatory action which gave the
relevant government agency great control over U.S. trade.
B. Regulatory Action
The mechanism of trade regulation established by the Trading With the
Enemy Act of 1917 continues to serve as the basis for regulations issued by
the Office of Foreign Assets Control of the Department of the Treasury. These
regulations prohibit any United States citizen or resident or any American-
controlled corporation-irrespective of the country in which it is doing busi-
ness-from dealing with communist countries unless properly licensed by
the U.S. Government. With respect to China and Cuba, the result was once a
total prohibition against exportation of any goods or unpublished technical
data. This prohibition applied even to goods and data which were not of U.S.
origin. In addition, purchase of commodities of Chinese origin was prohibited,
even if for resale or for export to non-American markets. Bunkering or de-
livery of petroleum products to Chinese ships, Chinese chartered ships, or
to ships which could have called at Chinese ports was also proscribed. Finally,
all Chinese assets (some $71 million)5 were blocked and frozen.
Pursuant to the Trading With the Enemy Act of 1917, the Treasury De-
partment has also issued Transaction Control Regulations 6 which authorize
the scrutiny and licensing of all exports to communist countries according
to both classes of goods and the country to which the delivery is to be made.
The power to license such exports is shared by the Treasury and Commerce
Departments; in fact, to avoid conflicts over authority, the Treasury Depart-
ment automatically confirms export licenses approved by the Commerce
Department. 7
The Export Control Act of 1949-administered by the Office of Export
Control of the Bureau of International Commerce of the Department of
Commerce-has served as a basis for the compilation of the Commodity Con-
trol List which, by an ingenious method, permits the regulatory agency to
control the flow of exports in support of U.S. foreign policy. The Commodity
Control List classifies, according to a code letter, each commodity requiring
an export license from the Office of Export Control. Correspondingly, each
country to which American exports may be directed is grouped in one of eight
categories according to another classification system designated by the letters
from Q to Z. Thus, the resultant combination of two letters will indicate which
commodities require a license depending upon the destination of the export.
Commodities listed under category "A" require an export license for all
destinations, while all countries in group "Z'--in which China was placed at
the time of its entry into the Korean War-require export licenses for all
3 Act of Feb. 26, 1949, ch. 11, §§ 1-12, 63 Stat. 7 (expired 1969).
4 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2401-13 (1970).
5 See Note, supra note 1, at 83-84.
6 31 C.F.R. §§ 505.01-505.60 (1973).
7 1d. § 500.533(a)(1).
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classes of goods. So long as China remained in class "Z," practically no exports
to that country were permitted. 8
C. 1969 Modifications
In 1969, the Export Control Act expired and was superseded by the Export
Administration Act,9 which reoriented the policies export controls were de-
signed to serve. The 1949 Act was intended to prevent distribution to any
nation representing a threat to U.S. national security of those commodities
which would make a significant contribution to the military or economic po-
tential of such nations. 10 While the 1969 Act retained the entire mechanism
of controls and regulations governing the licensing of exports, it modified
significantly the overall purpose of trade restrictions, limiting the absolute
prohibition of exports only to those items which would make a "significant
contribution to the military potential" of the country of destination.1 In addi-
tion, the 1969 Act was no longer specifically oriented against communist-
dominated nations.
The Export Administration Act of 1969 was the result of the growing con-
viction that the 1949 Act failed to achieve its purpose. The Soviet Union and
the P.R.C. had forged ahead with programs of economic and military devel-
opment, while the 1949 Act merely diverted Soviet and Chinese purchases
from the U.S. to other countries following a less restrictive policy. Hence, the
requirement that American commodities or technological data must not con-
tribute to the economic potential of the country of destination was eliminated.
Moreover, the criterion of availability was promulgated as a basis for licensing
the export of a commodity or technology to a communist country included on
the Commodity Control List. Undoubtedly, an important consideration bearing
on this liberalizing trend in export controls was the need to improve our
balance of payments.
II
RESTRICTIONS ON TRADE WITH CHINA
China emerged from World War II a close ally of the United States,
which had supported its ambition to achieve unification, independence, and
leadership in the postwar world. Not until the communist take-over in 1949
did the U.S. Government adopt any restrictive measures aimed specifically
at controlling and restricting trade with China. At the same time, formulation
of the Marshall Plan to assist in the European reconstruction caused the United
States to adopt a policy of allocating materials in short supply to countries which
participated in the Marshall Plan. Discrimination against other countries was,
at that time, merely an unintended side effect, not an immediate goal of the
U.S. Government. However, as the Soviet Union embarked on the policy of
establishing communist regimes in Eastern Europe, the element of national
8 See Note, supra note 1, at 80-81.
9 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 2401-13 (1970).
10 Act of Feb. 26, 1949, ch. 11, §§ 1-12, 63 Stat. 7 (expired 1969).
"1 50 U.S.C. App. § 2402 (1970).
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American-owned) to suspend execution of the contract since it was in violation
of the U.S. Transaction Control Regulations.' 7 The French minority directors
instituted proceedings when Fruehauf attempted to comply with the Treasury
Department directive. A temporary administrator was appointed by a French
court for the execution of the contract, and eventually the purposes of the
U.S. policy were frustrated. The French courts clearly acted in defense of
French economic interests, seeing to it that French foreign policy prevailed
over that of the United States.' 8
As a result of this conflict, the Treasury Regulations were amended to
provide that American firms in COCOM countries would no longer be subject
to the requirement that they obtain a U.S. license in addition to the one issued
by the host country for export of prohibited goods and technical data to
China.19 On the other hand, it continues to be the position of the U.S. Govern-
ment that a subsidiary or licensee residing or doing business in a non-COCOM
country remains subject to U.S. licensing regulations. Nevertheless, the recent
exportation of automobiles manufactured by American companies in Argentina
to a communist nation suggests that U.S. jurisdiction in even non-COCOM
countries may be seriously circumscribed.
IV
THE NEW COURSE
On June 10, 1971, controls on a large list of nonstrategic U.S. exports to
the People's Republic of China were terminated 20 in accordance with the
provisions of the Export Administration Act of 1969, as amended by the Equal
Export Opportunity Act of 1972,21 signaling a new era in Sino-American trade
relations. That move did not arrive unheralded. It was preceded by modifica-
tion of restrictions on the travel of U.S. citizens to China, permission for
American tourists to import Chinese goods for noncommercial purposes, 22 and
allowance of trade in nonstrategic goods with China by U.S. firms abroad,
provided that U.S. dollars were not used in the transactions. 2 3 In addition,
nonstrategic foreign-made products incorporating American produced com-
ponents and parts were authorized for sale and shipment to the P.R.C. in
April, 1970, subject only to obtaining an export license in each case.24 The fol-
lowing August, bunkering of free world ships carrying nonstrategic goods to
the P.R.C. with petroleum products of non-U.S. origin was permitted .2 Finally,
f31 C.F.R. §§ 505.01-505.60 (1973).
18 See also id. § 500.29, which extends U.S. jurisdiction to corporations and other entities abroad
owned and controlled by any citizen or resident of the United States or any person actually present
within the U.S.
1937 Fed. Reg. 3511, 3520 (1972).
o For a summary of those lists, see 64 DEP'T STATE BULL. 815 (1971). A more detailed listing
may be found in 36 Fed. Reg. 11,808 (1971).
21 Act of Aug. 29, 1972, §§ 101-210, 86 Stat. 644.
22 34 Fed. Reg. 12,179 (1969).
23Id. at 12,189.
24 U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, EXPORT CONTROL BULL. (Office of Export Control Pub. No.
16, 1970).
" Letter from U.S. Dep't of Treasury to interested firms, Aug. 26, 1970.
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security became increasingly more dominant in the allocation of materials.
The communist take-over in China in October, 1949, precipitated a pro-
hibition against exports of certain goods to China. The forbidden list was
expanded the following year with the outbreak of the Korean War and China's
intervention. A total prohibition of exports to what was now the People's Re-
public of China was ordered in December, 1950,12 including the revocation
of already issued export licenses. In addition, American planes and ships were
forbidden to land at Chinese airfields or call at Chinese ports; assets of Chinese
nationals residing in the United States were blocked (in response to the con-
fiscation of all American property in China); imports from China to the U.S.
were prohibited; parcel post shipments from China were barred; and U.S.
passports began to list China among the countries where travel for American
citizens was not authorized. Finally, the Foreign Assets Control Regulations
blocked assets in the United States which were, owned by residents of China.1 3
III
INTERNATIONAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC TRADE WITH
COMMUNIST COUNTRIES (COCOM)
In 1949, informal consultations were initiated between the U.S. Government
and its allies to achieve economic cooperation in stemming what at that time
looked like a tide of communist aggression in Europe and Asia. These informal
sessions ultimately developed into a system of prohibitions, enforced by a
number of countries from the American continent, Europe, and Asia, aimed
at denying strategic goods to communist nations. The legislative basis for
American participation was provided by the Mutual Defense Assistance Control
Act of 1951 (Battle Act).' 4
The interested countries have since established the International Coordi-
nating Committee on Strategic Trade with Communist Countries (COCOM). 15
The Committee maintains a list of goods which are uniformly denied to com-
munist countries, although each government reserves to itself the right to
deny export licenses to additional classes of goods. Accordingly, there are
considerable discrepancies in the trade policies of the countries involved which
sometimes lead to conflicts among the member countries. One example is
Fruehauf Corp. v. Massardy,1' which concerned the execution of a contract be-
tween Fruehauf-France and Berliet, S.A., for the delivery of sixty vans ear-
marked for shipment to the People's Republic of China. In January, 1965,
the U.S. Treasury Department directed Fruehauf (which was two-thirds
12 Lee, U.S. Policy Toward China: From Economic Warfare to Summit Diplomacy, in CHINA'S TRADE
WITH THE WEST: A POLITICAL AND ECONOMIc ANALYSIS 33 (A. Stahnke ed. 1972); 1957 U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, MUTUAL DEFENSE ASSISTANCE CONTROL ACT REPORTS 32.
13 Lee, supra note 12, at 43-44. See also Garson, The American Trade Embargo Against China,
in CHINA TRADE PROSPECTS AND U.S. POLICY 23-43 (A. Eckstein ed. 1971).
14 22 U.S.C. §§ 1611-13 (1970).
5 Initially the Committee, headquartered in Paris, consisted of two subcommittees, one dealing
with European communist countries, and the other with Far Eastern communist countries. In
due course the two were merged into one body. See generally Lee & McCobb, United States Trade
Embargo on China, 1949-1970: Legal Status and Future Prospects, 4 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 1 (1971).
16 5 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 476 (1966).
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on April 4, 1971, President Nixon announced further ameliorations in travel
and trade restrictions: visas for visitors from China were to be expedited; U.S.
currency controls were to be relaxed to permit the use of dollars in trade with
the P.R.C.; American vessels and planes were to be allowed to carry Chinese
cargoes between non-Chinese ports; U.S. firms were permitted to fuel Chinese
ships and aircraft (except those bound to and from North Vietnam, North Ko-
rea, or Cuba); and American-owned foreign flag carriers were permitted to call
at Chinese ports.2
6
The rationale behind these various steps was to modify the U.S. regimen
of China trade regulations in accordance both with changes taking place in
other countries and with changing attitudes in the United States itself. The
most significant domestic factor was the armistice in South Vietnam which
permitted the disengagement and withdrawal of American forces from that
country. At least in part, that armistice had to be credited to China's policy
of reducing tensions with the United States.
After the June 10, 1971 announcement removing the need for special
export licenses for goods and commodities excluded from the list, included
items could still be exported under the condition that a special license be ob-
tained-subject only to the general provisions safeguarding American national
security-in accordance with the U.S. export control regulations. Moreover,
under the general license provisions all imports from China were allowed
entry into the United States subject to the usual controls and customs duties
relating to goods originating in communist countries. The P.R.C. was also
included in the June 10, 1971 termination of the requirement that fifty per
cent of wheat, flour, and other grain exports be carried in American bottoms. 27
The June announcement was complemented by that of February 14, 1972,
which placed the P.R.C. in country group "Y" on the Commodity Control
List of the Department of Commerce, finally elevating China to the same
status accorded the Soviet Union.2 8
V
TOWARD A BILATERAL SYSTEM
Further progress in the development of U.S. economic cooperation with
China calls for bilateral action-a formal or informal trade agreement which
would meet the requirements of section 231 of the Trade Expansion Act of
1962,29 and a legislative act calling for a reciprocal trade agreement to grant
favorable tariff rates, a most-favored-nation clause, or duty free status. Of
all the nations with a communist regime, only Yugoslavia and Poland are in
this category. Nevertheless, there seem to be indications that the time may come
eventually when China will also be offered a more formal arrangement re-
garding terms of trade. A statement of policy suggesting this development
appears in the so-called "Shanghai Communique" issued at the termination
26 7 WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 628 (1971).
27 See 64 DEP'T STATE BULL. 815 (1971).
28 37 Fed. Reg. 3511 (1972). See also 66 DEP'T STATE BULL. 291 (1972).
29 19 U.S.C. § 1861 (1970).
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of the President's visit to China in February of 1972:
Both sides view bilateral trade as another area from which mutual benefit
can be derived, and agreed that economic relations based on equality and mutual
benefit are in the interest of the peoples of the two countries. They agree to
facilitate the progressive development of trade between their two countries.30
On the other hand, it is difficult to determine to what extent expanded
trade with the United States is desired by Chinese leaders. Recent remarks
by Undersecretary for Economic Affairs William J. Casey indicate that there is
little hope for a rapid growth in the volume of trade between the U.S. and
China, even though some progress has been made.3 ' Indeed, given the highly
centralized trade regime presently prevailing in China, there is no reason
to suppose that expansion of foreign trade will be other than a selective process.
The fact that Chinese importers have not availed themselves of the credit
opportunities available to them in the United States suggests a continuing
reluctance to expand American trade.3 2 Our experience in trading with the
communist countries on the whole confirms that foreign trade is primarily
a part of domestic industrialization plans, used almost exclusively to expand
their own productive capabilities.
30 66 DEP'T STATE BULL. 438 (1972).
31 See 69 DEP'T STATE BULL. 567 (1973).
32 Starr, supra note 1, at 30.
